The criminalization of medical mistakes in Canada: a review by McDonald, Fiona
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
McDonald, Fiona (2008) The criminalisation of medical mistakes in Canada : a 
review. Health Law Journal, 16. pp. 1-25. 
           
© Copyright 2008 Health Law Institute, University of Alberta 
The Criminalisation of Medical Mistakes in Canada: A Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiona McDonald 
Associate Lecturer, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Address and address for reprints: 
School of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
2 George Street, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane QLD 4001 
Australia 
Ph: + 61 (7)31382010 
Fax: + 61 (7)31382121 
fiona.mcdonald@qut.edu.au 
 
Sources of Support: 
This research was funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, the Alberta 
Heritage Foundation for Medical Research, and the Nova Scotia Health Research 
Foundation. 
 
Acknowledgements:  
I thank Catherine Brown, Dr. Christina Holmes, Dr Mavis Jones and Dr. Ben White 
for their most useful feedback.  I also thank Jackie Mapulanga-Hulston, Senior 
Research Assistant from the Law and Justice Research Centre at Queensland 
University of Technology, for her assistance.   
 
 
Word Count: 6933 
 
Number of figures and tables: 4 
 
Conflict of Interest: None 
 2 
The Criminalisation of Medical Mistakes in Canada: A Review 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of health professionals facing criminal charges of manslaughter or 
criminal negligence causing death or grievous bodily harm as a result of alleged 
negligence1 in their professional practice was thrown into stark relief by the recent 
acquittal of four physicians accused of mismanaging Canada‟s blood system in the 
early 1980s.2  Stories like these, as well as international reports detailing an increase 
in the numbers of physicians being charged with (and in some cases convicted of) 
serious criminal offences as the result of alleged negligence in their professional 
practice,3 have resulted in some anxiety about the apparent increase in the incidence 
of such charges and their appropriateness in the healthcare context.  Whilst research 
has focused on the incidence, nature and appropriateness of criminal charges against 
health professionals, particularly physicians, for alleged negligence in their 
professional practice in the United Kingdom,4 the United States,5 Japan,6 and New 
Zealand,7 the Canadian context has yet to be examined.    
This article examines the Canadian context and how the criminal law is used 
to regulate the negligent acts or omissions of a health care professional in the course 
of their professional practice.  It also assesses the appropriateness of such use.  It is 
important at this point to state that the analysis in this article does not focus on 
those, fortunately few, cases where a health professional has intentionally killed his 
or her patients8 but rather when patients‟ deaths or grievous injuries were allegedly 
as a result of that health professional‟s negligent acts or omissions when providing 
health services to that patient.9 
 
                                              
1 I predominantly use the terminology “negligent acts or omissions” or “negligence” in this paper, 
recognising that this is how the legal system characterises these types of occurrences.  In other 
contexts, especially patient safety literature, other terminology such as “errors” or “preventable adverse 
events” may be used. 
2 R v Armour Pharmaceutical Company [2007] O.J. 3733 (Ont. S.C.) [Armour]. 
3 See for example, R.E. Ferner & S. McDowell, “Doctors Charged with Manslaughter in the Course of 
Medical Practice, 1795-2005: A Literature Review” (2006) 99:6 J. R. Soc. Med. 309 [Ferner & 
McDowell, “Doctors”]; P.D.G. Skegg, “Criminal Prosecutions of Negligent Health Professionals: The 
New Zealand Experience” (1998) 6 Med L. Rev. 220 [Skegg, “Criminal Prosecutions”]; A. McCall 
Smith, “Criminal or Merely Human?: The Prosecution of Negligent Doctors” (1995) 12 J. Contemp. 
Health L. & Pol‟y 131 [McCall Smith, “Merely Human”]. 
4 Ferner & McDowell, “Doctors” ibid. 
5 J. Filkins, “„With No Evil Intent‟: The Criminal Prosecution of Physicians for Medical Negligence” 
(2007) 22:4 J. Leg. Med. 467.  
6  T. Hiyama, et al, “The Number of Criminal Prosecutions against Physicians Due to Medical 
Negligence is on the Rise in Japan” (2008) 26:1 Am. J. Emerg. Med. 105.  
7 Skegg, “Criminal Prosecutions” supra note 3. 
8 Dr Harold Shipman, a physician from the U.K., being the most notorious in this respect.  He was 
found guilty of murdering 15 of his patients and is suspected of murdering over 215 patients.   
9 Of course in some circumstances a health professional will act when they know that death is the 
probable result of a procedure and thus will be considered reckless.  However, their acts will be 
justifiably reckless if those actions are the only measure that may save the person from an otherwise 
certain death. An extreme example of this may be seen in the facts of Re A (children) (Conjoined Twins 
Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 (H.L.) where doctors undertook the surgical separation of 
conjoined twins knowing that the procedure would kill one twin but that absent such a procedure 
both twins would die. 
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In the first section of this article, I review the use of the criminal law in the 
healthcare context, discuss its theoretical justifications, and review the problems 
associated with its application in health care.  In the second section of this article, I 
move from theory to practice and examine the circumstances in which the criminal 
law is being employed as mechanism to address allegedly negligent acts or omissions 
committed by Canadian physicians in their professional practice which result in the 
deaths or grievous injuries of their patients.  More specifically, I quantify the numbers 
of physicians who have faced criminal charges in such circumstances and the 
outcomes of those cases.  I do this to determine the incidence of such charges in 
Canada but also to determine whether charging patterns and conviction and 
acquittal rates map with broader concepts about the appropriateness of the 
application of the criminal law in this context.  I then place these results in their 
broader context by comparing them, as much as it is possible to do so, with data from 
the United Kingdom.10  Although other health professionals have faced criminal 
charges as the result of alleged negligence in their professional practice, I focus the 
analysis in this article on physicians.  I do this because the data is strongest for this 
group and also to enable comparison with the data from the United Kingdom which 
focuses on physicians.  However, the discussion and analysis in this article also 
applies to other health professionals.   
 
2. Criminal Law and Negligent Acts 
Criminal liability for negligence has long been contentious as it raises, to 
quote McCall Smith, “fundamental issues of criminal policy which go to the heart of 
our notions of when it is appropriate to punish those whose conduct demonstrates 
fault rather than an intention to inflict harm.”11  Some suggest that negligence should 
not be a basis for criminal liability, as criminal sanctions should only be imposed 
upon people for the consequences of actions they intended or outcomes that they 
foresaw as a probable consequence of their actions.12  Others support the imposition 
of criminal sanctions for those who were negligent on the basis that a defendant 
could have complied with expected standards of conduct expected by reasonable 
persons but did not do so.13  In addition, supporters argue on utilitarian grounds that 
the threat of criminal sanction has a prospective effect in that it encourages improved 
standards of practice.14   
Despite this principled disagreement the latter view prevails and criminal 
liability can be found for grossly negligent conduct in the common-law and in the 
codified criminal law in Canada.   Those whose negligent acts or omissions cause a 
death may face, in Canada, a charge of criminal negligence causing death or in other 
common-law countries a charge of manslaughter through gross negligence. 
 
                                              
10 There are of course difficulties in making such comparisons and I discuss these difficulties in greater 
detail later in this article.  
11 A. McCall Smith, “Criminal Negligence and the Incompetent Doctor” (1993) 1 Med. L. Rev. 336 at 336 
[McCall Smith, “Incompetent Doctor”]. 
12 J. Hall, “Negligent Behaviour should be Excluded from Penal Liability” (1963) 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632, 
McCall Smith, “Merely Human” supra note 3. 
13 See notably, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968) and H.L.A. Hart, “Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility” in A.G. Guest, ed., 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 29.  
14 See notably, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968) and H.L.A. Hart, “Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility” in A.G. Guest, ed., 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 29.  
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Criminal Negligence and Health Professionals 
Negligent acts, or omissions, by health professionals in the course of their 
professional practice are part of the human condition - after all, to quote Alexander 
Pope, “to err is human”.  The law has long responded to these events in a variety of 
ways, most commonly through the provision of compensation to injured patients 
through the use of tort law and the imposition of sanctions against health 
professionals through professional regulatory mechanisms.  But in the gravest of such 
circumstances the criminal law has a long history as a tool through which to address 
alleged negligence in a health professional‟s practice which results in the death or 
grievous injury of a patient.  A case in England where a health professional was found 
criminally liable for negligence dates from the 14th century.15  Use of the criminal law 
is the strongest mechanism through which the state can hold an individual to 
account for actions that are contrary to the public interest.  No person because of his 
or her professional status should be immune from the criminal law.  However, there 
are specific circumstances associated with the provision of health services which 
make finding criminal liability for alleged negligence in professional practice 
especially challenging. 
One of the most significant challenges associated with using the criminal law 
against health professionals for negligence in professional practice is that criminal 
law is ill-equipped to address the complexities of the environment within which 
health professionals commonly operate – the modern healthcare system.  The 
paradigm of the criminal law is based upon an acknowledgement of human agency - 
an autonomous individual makes a decision to act (or not to act) in a manner that 
contravenes the law and must accept the consequences of that action or omission – it 
is a simple world that recognises few relational factors.  Criminal negligence is 
commonly employed in respect of deaths caused in motor vehicle accidents - a 
relatively uncomplicated context where an individual is clearly making decisions 
about when and how they intend to drive.    When the criminal law was initially used 
to regulate health professionals in the 14th and subsequent centuries, services were 
provided very much in an individual context, there being no health system to speak 
of.  The historical foundations of healthcare are based upon the autonomous 
professional who is either competent or incompetent in his or her professional 
practice and this conception still resonates as to how responsibility is assigned in this 
realm.  However, the present reality, that most health professionals are embedded in 
the complexity of modern healthcare, with its multiple interacting health care 
providers and treatments, caring for patients with multiple co-morbidities, at times 
using advanced technology, in a highly pressured environment, is not always 
acknowledged.16  The key findings of research into the psychology of error are that 
often errors are not the outcome of individual incompetence but are created by 
factors inherent to the complex system within which that individual works.17  An 
acknowledgement of context in many circumstances may undermine an individual‟s 
culpability and blameworthiness or as Alicke puts it “factors that establish personal 
control intensify blame, whereas constraints on personal control potentially mitigate 
                                              
15 O. Quick, “Prosecuting „Gross‟ Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion and the Crown 
Prosecution Service” (2006) 33:3 J. Law & Soc 421 [Quick, “Prosecuting”]. 
16 S. Dekker, “Discontinuity and Disaster: Gaps and the Negotiation of Culpability on Medication 
Delivery” (2007) J. L. Med. & Ethics 463 [Dekker, “Discontinuity”]. 
17 See for example, J. Reason, Human Error (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) [Reason, 
Human Error].  
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blame.”18  Both the criminal law and our perceptions of responsibility in healthcare 
are still firmly individualistic in nature and may not enable recognition of the context 
within which these services emerge and are created.   What this points to is the moral 
ambiguity inherent in assigning criminal responsibility to a health professional whose 
agency is limited by the environment in which he or she practices; an ambiguity that 
raises questions about justice.    
 
The Tests for Criminal Negligence 
Whilst the concept of the criminal responsibility for negligence has been 
accepted in law, it has remained challenging to elucidate a principled test for 
criminally negligent conduct that creates a bright line between conduct that is 
negligent and conduct that is sufficiently negligent to attract criminal sanctions.  In 
jurisdictions like England the offence is termed manslaughter and in Canada criminal 
negligence causing death, but in both countries the standard for culpability is the 
same – gross or criminal negligence.19  Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority in 
Anderson, suggested that criminal negligence “has proved to be one of the most 
difficult and uncertain [areas of the law] in the whole of the criminal field.”20  
Generally, to constitute criminal negligence the accused‟s conduct must amount to a 
marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the circumstances – thus the greater the risk of harm the more likely that a 
reasonable person and the person concerned should have foreseen consequences 
which are the natural result of the conduct which creates the risk.21  In R v Bateman the 
English Court of Criminal appeal stated: “In explaining … whether the negligence, in 
the particular case, amounted or did not amount to a crime, judges have used many 
epithets, such as „culpable‟, „criminal‟, „gross‟, „wicked‟, „clear‟, „complete‟.  But, 
whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish 
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence 
of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and 
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against 
the state and conduct deserving punishment.”22  Lord MacKay in Adamoko provided 
further: “The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant‟s 
conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as 
it must have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be judged 
criminal”.23   These types of definitions have attracted criticism for being circular.24   
In practice what this means is that, in both England and Canada, there is a 
distinction, albeit one of degree, between mere negligence and gross negligence 
                                              
18 M. Alicke, “Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame” (2000) 1265 Psych. Bull. 556 at 557 
quoted in Dekker, “Discontinuity” supra note 16. 
19 To convict someone of manslaughter in England the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is under a duty of care, is in breach of this duty to the extent of being grossly 
negligent and the breach caused the victim‟s death. R v Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171 (H.L) per Lord 
MacKay [Adomoko cited to A.C.].  J. Horder, “Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability” (1997) 47 
U.T.L.J. 495 [Horder, “Gross Negligence”]. 
20 R v Anderson [1990] 1 S.C.R. 265. 
21 Ibid. 
22 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 at 11 (C.A.) per Lord Justice Hewart - this was subsequently 
approved by the House of Lords in Andrews v DPP [1937] A.C. 576, 583 [Andrews cited to A.C.] and  
Adomako supra note 19. 
23 Ibid at 87.  These definitions survived a challenge based on their compatibility with the European 
Convention on Human Rights see R v Misra [2005] 1 Cr. App. R 21. 
24 Horder, “Gross Negligence” supra note 19. 
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sufficient to attract criminal sanction.  Or, as Lord Atkin put it: “Simple lack of care 
such as will constitute civil liability is not enough; for the purposes of the criminal 
law there are degrees of negligence; and a very high degree of negligence is required to 
be proved before the felony is established.”25  This sentiment was phrased somewhat 
similarly in the Ontario Court of Appeal by Weiler J.A. who stated that “the offence 
of criminal negligence causing death is at the high end of a continuum of moral 
blameworthiness.”26   
In suggesting that there are, to use Lord Atkin‟s term, “degrees of 
negligence”27 or Weiler J.A.‟s term “continuum of moral blameworthiness” the courts 
are establishing a process where first the police and prosecutors and then the judge or 
the jury must assess the nature of the allegedly negligent act and make a judgement as 
to where it falls on a continuum.  This is at all times a difficult judgement but it is 
particularly fraught when considering the consequences of the negligent actions of 
health professionals which may involve the death or grievous injury of a patient.  The 
outcome, the death or grievous injury of the patient, should not be conflated into the 
equation that determines how morally blameworthy or how negligent an action or 
omission is, yet too often this can occur.28  Douglas, for example, would argue that we 
increasingly live in a blame society where “every death and most illnesses will give 
scope for defining blameworthiness.”29 
Research into the psychology of error may assist in making these types of 
determinations about where a negligent act sits on a continuum of negligence or 
moral blameworthiness.  Reason‟s typology of human error suggests that there are 
four forms of errors: 1) mistakes: errors in planning; 2) slips or lapses: errors in 
execution; 3) technical errors: failure to carry out action successfully even if the plan 
of action and technique were appropriate; and 4) violations: deliberate deviation from 
safe practice.30  In regards to the first three categories, peoples‟ acts or omissions are 
more apt to be less morally blameworthy and more likely to be causatively influenced 
by systemic factors, especially in complex environments such as healthcare.  The last 
category contains a heightened element of moral blameworthiness, albeit in the 
context of negligence, which can be ascribed solely to an individual.  Thus Merry and 
McCall Smith suggest that only violations, deliberate deviations from safe practice, 
should attract criminal prosecutions, as only violations involve moral 
blameworthiness.31   
The difficulty with this type of categorisation exercise is what constitutes a 
violation?  In hindsight it often appears to quote Dekker “as if people chose to err, 
despite available evidence indicating they were about to make the wrong choice and 
despite their knowledge and experience that would have allowed them to do 
otherwise.”32  In other words people may know that the course of action they are 
taking gives rise to a risk of harm.  The question then must be in what circumstances 
are they relationally constrained into the course of action by environmental factors 
and when do they volitionally choose to take the course of action?   McCall Smith 
                                              
25 Andrews supra note 22. 
26 R. v J.L [2006] O.J. 131 at para. 14. 
27 Andrews supra note 22. 
28 B. Runciman, A. Merry, & M. Walton, Safety and Ethics in Healthcare: A Guide to Getting it Right 
(Aldershot & Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) [Runciman, Merry & Walton, Putting it Right].  
29 M. Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1992) at 6. 
30 Reason, Human Error supra note 17. 
31 Alan Merry & Alexander McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) [Merry & McCall Smith, Errors].  
32 Dekker, “Discontinuity” supra note 16 at 467. 
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uses the example of a medication error to point to the difficulties in this area.33  Is it 
grossly negligent to fill a syringe with a drug and inject it into the patient without 
checking the label of the drug? Yes, because checking a label is an elementary 
precaution that everyone, even laypersons, accepts is required.  But what if the label 
is misread when health professionals are under pressure?  Ensuring that sufficient 
time is taken to carefully and correctly read the label is another elementary 
precaution and a failure to so read could seem to be a deliberate deviation from safe 
practice. However, interpreted another way a failure to carefully and correctly read a 
label could be construed as a slip or a lapse – an error in execution. Environmental 
factors can influence conduct, such as when a patient is dying, there is an influx of 
patients waiting care, or a health professional attends 30 patients.  Contextual factors 
specific to the individual such as fatigue, lapses in concentration etc can also 
influence conduct – lapses that are all too human.  Is such a lapse gross negligence 
sufficient to attract criminal sanction or human error amounting to negligence? Who 
is morally blameworthy - health professionals who have legal duties and ethical 
obligations to their patients or the systems in which they work, where multiple 
patients, complex systems and overwhelmed health professionals, conspire to create 
an environment ripe for error or both?  Is there moral blameworthiness in these 
circumstances sufficient to require criminal sanctions being imposed against an 
individual?     
Reason‟s typology provides an empirical basis upon which to assess where on 
the continuum a negligent act or omission may fall – whether it is civil or civil and 
criminal negligence.  What the use of Reason‟s typology in this context indicates is 
that clear violations, where an individual, or an institution in respect of corporate 
manslaughter, deliberately chooses not to comply with basic standards of safe 
practice, should attract criminal sanctions and the health professional/health service 
provider should be held accountable by society for their grossly negligent conduct.   
Equally it indicates that the criminal law should be used far more judiciously in 
respect of the other categories of error where the blameworthiness of an individual 
for an action or omission is more opaque.  In these circumstances, retrospective 
accountability34 against an individual can be obtained through other measures, such 
as professional discipline or competency review, tort litigation, or privileges review 
processes.  Prospective accountability35 in this venue may be best served by not 
raising the spectre of criminal convictions against health professionals, but by 
implementing systemic changes to the culture of the health professions and the 
environments and systems in which health professionals serve.  It is important to 
remember at a policy level that the prosecution of an individual can protect an unsafe 
system from scrutiny and therefore preclude that institution from learning and 
improving the systems for treatment and care36 - an outcome that is not in the public 
interest. 
 
3. The Criminal Law and Negligence in Professional Practice in 
Canada 
                                              
33 McCall Smith, “Incompetent Doctor” supra note 11. 
34 V. Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility for Medical Mistakes” in S. Rubin & L Zoloth eds. Margin of Error: 
The Ethics of Mistakes in the Practice of Medicine (Hagerstown Md.: University Publishing Group, 2000) 183 
-92. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Dekker, “Discontinuity” supra  note 16 at 467. 
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It is clear that the threshold for criminal prosecution needs to be relatively 
high, and thus criminal charges can be expected to be considerably rarer than actions 
for negligence.  Despite an increase in litigation over the last several years, numbers of 
claims in tort for negligence remain low relative to the numbers of health services 
provided on a daily basis, the numbers of physicians and other health professionals 
that are employed in health systems and the numbers of negligent acts or omissions 
within the sector.37  But saying that criminal charges for alleged negligence in 
professional practice should be rare and are rare, albeit increasing, in other 
jurisdictions does not help establish the rates of such charges in Canada, nor the rates 
of convictions.  Nor does it assist with an assessment of whether the criminal law is 
being employed appropriately in this area in accordance with the principles outlined 
above.  In this section of the article I: quantify the numbers of physicians charged 
with criminal negligence in the course of their professional practice in Canada; 
examine the outcomes of such charges; place the charging and conviction rates 
within the broader international context; categorise the nature of the negligent acts 
or omissions where charges have been laid; and analyse the factors deemed relevant to 
the courts when making determinations of guilt or innocence.       
 
Research Design and Methods 
To establish the numbers of cases where physicians in Canada were charged 
with criminal negligence/manslaughter causing death or grievous bodily harm I 
conducted a search of relevant databases between the years 1900 and 2007 to 
ascertain the numbers of such cases and whether there were any significant historical 
trends associated with incidence. This review of the number of physicians charged 
with criminal negligence/manslaughter as a result of alleged negligence in 
professional practice was designed, allowing for differences in context,38 to mimic 
Ferner and McDowell‟s39 study of physicians charged with manslaughter in the 
course of their professional practice in the United Kingdom.  This similarity in 
methods was in part to provide a basis for cross-jurisdictional comparison.  I examine 
a 107 year time period to indicate that such charges are not a new phenomenon and to 
place the incidence of such charges in context; that very few charges have been laid 
across a large expanse of years, especially when one considers the likely numbers of 
patient interactions during that time period. 
I searched The Globe and Mail: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 (1900-2003),40 Lexis 
Nexis Quicklaw (1900 – 2007), and Westlaw eCarswell (1900 - 2007) databases to identify 
relevant newspaper articles and law reports.  I also searched the titles and abstracts 
of the Canadian Medical Association Journal (1966-2007) electronically.  I used the text 
words physician or surgeon or anaesthetist and criminal negligence or manslaughter to 
undertake the search.41  The search parameters were limited to cases where 
                                              
37 See for example, D. Studdert et al., “Negligent Care and malpractice Claims Behaviour in Utah and 
Colorado” (2000) 38(3) Med. Care 250; P. Weilier et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice 
Litigation and Patient Compensation (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
38 One key difference between the U.K. and Canada is that in Canada the Criminal Code of Canada R.S., 
1985, c. C-46 s. 219 contains specific offences relating to criminal negligence causing death or grievous 
bodily harm whereas in the United Kingdom the common-law offence of manslaughter is used to 
charge physicians whose alleged negligence in their professional practice results in the death of their 
patient.  The search terms were adjusted accordingly. 
39 Ferner & McDowell, “Doctors” supra note 3. 
40 This database covers the years 1844 – 2003.  Subsequent editions of this newspaper are searchable in 
the Lexis Nexis Quicklaw database. 
41 The Canadian Medical Association Journal is electronically searchable from 1966 onwards. 
 9 
negligence in professional practice resulted in criminal charges being laid against a 
physician.  I excluded from consideration physicians facing criminal charges 
associated with criminal abortion, assisted suicide or euthanasia, or where there was 
any allegation that the patient‟s death was intentional.   
To ascertain how Canadian courts are applying the criminal negligence 
standard and assessing culpability, I assessed the alleged negligent acts or omissions 
seen in the Canadian cases in light of Reason‟s typology of human error.42  I assessed 
the acts or omissions from the identified cases, where possible, as: 1) mistakes: errors 
in planning; 2) slips or lapses: errors in execution; 3) technical errors: failure to carry 
out action successfully even if the plan of action and technique were appropriate; and 
4) violations: deliberate deviation from safe practice. 43 
The Globe and Mail is the closest Canada has to a truly national newspaper, but 
historically its focus was on Ontario and, to some extent, Québec and thus its 
coverage of events in other provinces and territories is historically incomplete.  
Databases of other newspapers, contained within Lexis Nexis Quicklaw, date back to 
the 1980s at the earliest.  The legal databases primarily cover reported cases, with 
unreported cases only becoming available on these databases from the early 1980s.  I 
was unable to find three of the cases identified through the Globe and Mail search in 
the case-law databases which meant that there was little available information about 
the facts of those cases, the legal reasoning associated with the outcomes, and in one 
case its outcome.  Likewise, several of the cases identified in the case-law search were 
not identifiable in the Globe and Mail search.   It is possible that some relevant early 
cases may not have been identified because data was unavailable; however, the 
reliability of the data increases from the 1980s because of improvements in database 
coverage.   
 
Results 
Using the search terms set out above, I identified 15 physicians charged with 
manslaughter or criminal negligence causing death or causing grievous bodily injury 
as a result of alleged negligence in their professional practice between the years 1900 
and 2007 (figure 1).44  Only one physician was charged with manslaughter.  All of the 
others were charged with criminal negligence causing death or grievous bodily harm.  
Only one physician has been convicted (after a guilty plea) and that conviction was 
for criminal negligence causing bodily harm (table 1).  Five physicians faced charges 
in respect of an alleged failure to diagnose and therefore to appropriately treat a 
condition, four due to alleged mismanagement of the Canadian blood system, two in 
relation to the prescription or administration of medications, two faced charges in 
the context of the provision of methadone to patients, one in relation to the 
management of a birth and one in relation to anaesthesia. The specialities of the 
physicians charged are set out in table 2.  
Applying Reason‟s typology of human error I classified two cases as 
violations: both resulted in convictions, although one was overturned on appeal.  I 
                                              
42 Reason, Human Error supra note 17. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Also charged with criminal negligence, and more rarely manslaughter, related to alleged errors in 
professional practice were 17 other health professionals: two former physicians (one in the capacity of 
a midwife/birth attendant and the other as a naturopath); three persons who provided medical 
services but who were not registered, or indeed trained, as physicians; one electro-therapist; one 
chiropractor; four nurses; one pharmacist; two naturopaths; and three midwives/birth attendants.  As 
this research focuses on physicians, these other health professionals were excluded from this analysis.     
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classified one case as technical error; this too resulted in a conviction that was 
overturned on appeal.  One case was classified as a slip or lapse with a not guilty 
finding.  Nine cases were classified as mistakes and in one of these cases the physician 
was convicted, although again the conviction was overturned on appeal.  I was unable 
to classify two cases because of insufficient information.  Examples are set out 
below.45  
 
Mistakes 
Case 8: 1992 
A teenager died after drinking what he thought was white rum but which was 
subsequently determined to be methyl hydrate (anti-freeze).  The physician who 
assessed the teenager when he and two others presented to the local emergency 
department sent them home with instructions to drink plenty of fluids.  The court 
held that the conduct of the physician who assessed and treated him “did fall below 
the standard of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances” and was an error of 
judgement which “though tragic in its consequences, was made in light of all the facts 
as he perceived them at the time.”46  Accordingly, the physician‟s conduct did not 
show a “wanton and reckless disregard” for the patient‟s “life and safety” sufficient to 
meet the standard required for criminal negligence.47  In this case, although the 
patient died the seriousness of the outcome was not sufficient in and of itself to 
constitute a criminal act.  The physician‟s exercise of professional judgement, 
although flawed, was made in the context of a busy emergency department amidst 
uncertainties about what substance was actually drunk and therefore was not 
sufficient to a attract criminal conviction. 
 
Case 11: 2005 
A 29 year old woman with a history of drug addiction had been on a 
methadone program under the supervision of the physician.  After she ceased taking 
methadone she became depressed, agitated and suicidal and on several occasions was 
admitted for psychiatric treatment.  She was prescribed a variety of medication 
whilst in hospital and was discharged for follow-up by the physician.  The physician 
became aware that she had started to take a mixture of other medications and 
required her to attend the clinic each day to access her medication.  The patient‟s 
condition worsened and she threatened to commit suicide if she did not get 
assistance.  The physician could not get her admitted into hospital immediately and 
as an interim measure prescribed two 20mg doses of methadone; the patient 
consumed one dose immediately and was thought to have taken the other a few hours 
later.  The patient died some hours later.  The physician was acquitted because it 
could not be established beyond reasonable doubt that the methadone caused her 
death as she had consumed a variety of medications and therefore the cause of death 
was uncertain.  In addition, there was doubt as to whether the physician‟s actions 
constituted a “marked and substantial departure from the norm”48 with evidence 
being led that indicated that that norm for the prescription of methadone at that time 
was uncertain.  In this case, unlike some of the others considered here, there were few 
external or systemic factors that influenced the physician‟s exercise of professional 
                                              
45 Cases are listed chronologically, for example, case 1 is the earliest case. 
46 G. Abate, “Newmarket MD not guilty of criminal negligence” Globe and Mail (1 February 1992) A:6 
[Abate, “Newmarket MD”]. 
47 Ibid. 
48 R. v Swanney [2006] B.C.S.C. 1766. 
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judgement.  However, setting aside issues associated with causation, the expert 
evidence presented indicated uncertainty within the profession about the 
appropriate level in these circumstances at this time at which to prescribe methadone 
and what, if any, other diagnostic tests should be undertaken before prescribing 
methadone and therefore whether the physician‟s actions were negligent, let alone 
criminally negligent.       
 
Cases 12-15: 2007 
Four physicians faced multiple charges of criminal negligence for allegedly 
permitting or causing the distribution of a blood product that was infected with HIV 
to four persons to whom the blood products were administered in the course of 
medical treatment.49  These persons subsequently contracted HIV and all but one has 
died as a consequence of the infection.  One of the physicians was responsible for the 
distribution of blood products in Canada and two of the physicians were responsible 
for the regulation of blood products in Canada in the early to mid 1980s.  The 
remaining physician worked for the pharmaceutical company that manufactured the 
blood products.  Madam Justice Benotto concluded that “… the conduct examined in 
detail for over one and a half years confirms reasonable, responsible and professional 
actions and responses during a difficult time.  The allegations of criminal conduct on 
the part of these men and this corporation were not only unsupported by the 
evidence, they were disproved.”50  Justice Benotto also noted that it was important to 
ensure that “subsequently acquired knowledge is not imported into the analysis” 51 – 
knowledge of the tragic outcome cannot affect the assessment of the decision-making 
processes at the time.   
 
Slips and Lapses 
Case 2: 1939 
A patient was prescribed mapharsen by a house surgeon.  The house surgeon 
instructed a nurse to get the drug and prepare a tray so he could treat the patient, 
adding that if no mapharsen was available the nurse could substitute novarsan.  The 
nurse misheard because of an interruption and placed an ampoule of diarsenol on the 
tray (this was apparently the only ampoule of diarsenol within the hospital and the 
physicians and nurses who testified were surprised that it was in the medicine 
cabinet).  Mapharsen, novarsan, and diarsenol were in small ampoules that were 
similar in size and shape and the drugs were the same colour.  However, the labelling 
on the ampoule of diarsenol was in red on a light background, whereas the other 
drugs were labelled in white letters on a dark background.  The house surgeon, 
without checking the label, injected the diarsenol into the patient, who died shortly 
afterwards.  There were normally three supervising nurses on duty on that floor who 
would have usually double-checked the medication trays but on the day in question 
none were on duty and so no check was made.  The house surgeon was very busy and 
his wife was very ill.  Having regard to these circumstances, and to evidence from 
other physicians that there must be “team work between the nurse and the doctor” 
the judge determined that there was no evidence of gross negligence, wanton 
misconduct or intent and absent this to convict the accused would be carrying 
                                              
49 The pharmaceutical company that manufactured the blood products also faced charges of criminal 
negligence.    
50 Armour supra note 2 at para. 305. 
51 Ibid  at para. 4. 
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criminal liability too far.52  There appeared to be some systems in place to prevent 
these types of errors, such as cross-checking of the drugs, a written prescription, a 
practice of not storing drugs that are not in common use in the medicine cabinet, and 
differences in the labelling of the ampoules.  However, these safeguards were defeated 
by a variety of latent defects, such as short-staffing and a busy and rushed 
environment with a consequential impact on actors functioning within that 
environment, and thus the negligence occurred.           
 
Technical Errors 
Case 3: 1962 
A premature baby died a few days after his birth from a cerebral haemorrhage.  
The baby‟s head got stuck during the delivery requiring, in the physician‟s opinion, 
either the use of forceps or a caesarean section.  The physician chose to use forceps 
and it was alleged that he used forceps wrongly during the delivery and caused the 
cerebral haemorrhage.  Evidence was presented that alleged that the physician 
applied sustained traction for ten minutes, although other evidence was also led that 
suggested that intermittent traction was applied during a period of several minutes.  
The balance of the expert evidence was that the use of forceps was appropriate in the 
circumstances, given the condition of the baby, and that the forceps were employed 
appropriately.  The judge held that on the evidence that the surgeon had proceeded in 
a “normal and reasonable manner”53 and therefore did not appear to be negligent, let 
alone reaching the standard required for criminal negligence. 
 
Violations 
Case 1: 1935 
A man died nine days after being admitted into a hospital.  It was alleged that 
the physician had failed to diagnose and treat the patient and was drunk whilst 
examining the patient on at least two occasions.  The physician‟s conviction was 
overturned on appeal after the court determined that too much weight was placed on 
the physician‟s apparent drunken condition.  Although it appeared that the physician 
may have been drunk on at least two occasions when he examined the patient, he 
appeared sober during other consultations.  There was no evidence presented to the 
court that suggested an “omission or failure to supply proper treatment.”54  The 
conduct, apparent drunkenness, was reprehensible and a deliberate deviation by the 
physician from safe practice and the established norms of professional conduct, but 
this deviation did not seem to lead to any negligence in the diagnosis and treatment 
of the patient and accordingly the patient‟s death could not be attributed to the act or 
omission of the physician.     
 
Case 10: 1995 
The teenage patient underwent routine surgery to mend his broken leg when 
the anaesthetic equipment became disconnected and he was left with an irreversible 
brain injury in a persistent vegetative state.  The anaesthetic equipment had four 
safety systems, two of which the anaesthetist did not use, despite a nurse‟s 
suggestion to the contrary.  The anaesthetist left the room to make a personal phone 
call without providing further instructions for the patient‟s care. During his fairly 
lengthy, in the circumstances, absence the anaesthetic equipment became 
                                              
52 R. v Giardine (1939) 71 Can. CC 295 at 299. 
53 R. v Simard (1963) 43 C.R. 70. 
54 R. v. Watson, [1936] B.C.J. 96. 
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disconnected; one alarm failed to function and the other was not immediately 
noticed.  The anaesthetist could not immediately been found once it was noticed.  
The anaesthetist subsequently made a false statement saying that he was present in 
the theatre during these events.  The anaesthetist pled guilty and was sentenced to 
six months imprisonment.55   The appeal court concluded that “all of this places his 
conduct much beyond the range of pure mischance, or, as the trial judge expressed it, 
“as being explained away by a combination of unfortunate circumstances”.”56   In 
other words, whilst there could have been systemic factors that contributed to the 
outcome, the defendant‟s decisions to deliberately deviate from safe practices directly 
led to the harm to the patient. 
 
Results in Context 
Outcomes 
I identified 15 physicians in Canada who faced serious criminal charges as a 
result of alleged negligence in professional practice between 1900 and 2007 (107 
years).  The conviction rate is a low 6.67 percent (one guilty plea).  Given the 
numbers of physicians registered to practice over this period (in 2006 alone 
according to the Canadian Institute for Health Information Canada had 62,307 
registered physicians57) and the number of patient consultations that will have 
occurred within this time period, it is apparent that in Canada very few physicians 
face serious criminal charges as a result of negligence in their practice and even fewer 
are convicted.    
Placing the Canadian figures in an international context makes this 
conclusion even more strongly.  The best comparative data comes from the U.K. 
where Ferner and McDowell undertook a longitudinal study of charging patterns58 
and where there is significant concern about substantial increases in the numbers of 
charges laid since the 1990s.  Such a comparison can only be made with caution; 
amongst other things it is important to note that the Canadian figures include 
criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing grievous bodily 
harm, whereas the United Kingdom figures only include charges where the allegedly 
negligent act resulted in death and which resulted in manslaughter charges.  In the 
United Kingdom during the period 1900 – 2005 approximately 54 physicians were 
charged with manslaughter in relation to errors in practice with an approximately 30 
percent conviction rate59 (see figure 2).  That more physicians were charged in the 
U.K. is not altogether surprising given the differences in terms of population and in 
the number of physicians registered given those populations. However, even taking 
population changes into account it is clear that physicians in the United Kingdom are 
more likely to face serious criminal charges for errors in practice and are more likely 
to be convicted of those charges than their Canadian counterparts.   There too, many 
of the charges related to events that Ferner and McDowell categorised as mistakes, 
slips and lapses and technical error, as well as violations.  The conviction rates for 
violations were higher than for the other categories at 63 percent.60 
                                              
55 R. v Manjanatha, [1995] 8 W.W.R. 101, 131 Sask. R. 316, 95 W.A.C. 316. 
56 Ibid at para 11. 
57Canadian Institute for Health Information, Health Care in Canada 2008 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for 
Health Information, 2008) at 16.    
58 Ferner & McDowell, “Doctors” supra note 3.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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The rate at which charges are laid does not appear to have increased in 
Canada (see figure 2).  The minor spike identifiable in 2005 relates to charges being 
laid against four physicians in relation to the management of the Canadian blood 
system in the 1980s and can be regarded as unusual.  Contrast this with the United 
Kingdom where the rates of charges laid against physicians has substantially 
increased since the early 1990s.61   
 
Explaining differences in outcomes 
What factors explain why charging rates in Canada remain low or, expressed 
another way, why rates in the U.K. are so high?  As there are no significant differences 
in nature of the charges faced by physicians, we must look to cultural factors to 
provide an explanation.  There is a great deal of speculation as to why there has been 
such a significant increase in the rates of physicians facing manslaughter charges in 
the U.K. for allegedly negligent professional practice. These speculations point to a 
different climate within which health services are provided in the U.K. and different 
systems, structures, and priorities within its justice system.  Some, such as Holbrook, 
suggest that the increased incidence of criminal charges against health providers is 
associated with changing societal perceptions that require an attribution of blame 
against events that would have formerly been accepted as accidents.62  Quick also 
points to changing societal perceptions about the professions and the level of trust 
vested in them by the public.63  In addition to a general sense that we increasingly live 
in a “post-trust society”64, in the U.K. trust in the medical profession and the health 
system more generally has been shaken by a number of high profile events in which 
patients have died as the result of negligent or intentional acts or omissions.65  The, as 
Quick puts it, „fallout‟ from these events may result in public and media pressure for 
accountability and to assign blame, a pressure felt most acutely by agencies such as 
the police and the prosecutions services that are seen by the public as being in a 
position to ensure that „justice‟ must seen to be done.66  The lack of trust has been 
accompanied by empirical evidence of the levels of adverse events in health care67 as 
well as an increase in the numbers of complaints made against providers of health 
services.68  The apparent trust deficit in the U.K. towards the ability of the health 
professionals to effectively self-regulate may, at least in part, explain the sharp 
                                              
61 Ibid. 
62 J. Holbrook, “The Criminalisation of Fatal Medical Mistakes” (2003) 327:7424 B.M.J. 1118. 
63 Quick, “Prosecuting” supra note 15. 
64 See for example, R.E. Lofstedt, Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005). 
65 See for example, Quick, “Prosecuting” supra note 15; Secretary of State for Heath (U.K.), A First Class 
Service: Quality in the New NHS (London: Department of Health, 1998).   
66 Quick, “Prosecuting” supra note 15.  
67 C. Vincent, G. Neale, & M. Woloshynowych, “Adverse Events in British Hospitals: Preliminary 
Retrospective Record Review” (2001) 322:7285 B.M.J. 517, erratum in: (2001) 322:7299 B.M.J. 1395, 
Similar results have been found in other countries that have studied the incidence of adverse events for 
example G. Baker, et al. “The Canadian Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse Events Among 
Hospital Patients in Canada” (2004) 170:11 C.M.A.J. 1678; T.A. Brennan et al. “Incidence of Adverse 
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I” 
(1991) 324:6 N. Engl. J. Med. 370; R. Wilson et al., “Quality in Australian Health Care Study (1995) 163:9 
Med. J. Aust. 458; T. Schioler et al., Danish Adverse Event Study “[Incidence of Adverse Events in 
Hospitals. A Retrospective Study of Medical Records]” (2001) 163:39 Ugeskr Laeger 5370 and P. Davis, 
et al., “Adverse Events in New Zealand Public Hospitals I: Occurrence and Impact” (2002) 115:1167 N.Z. 
Med. J. U271. 
68 Quick, “Prosecuting” supra note 15. 
 15 
increase in the numbers of charges laid against physicians alleging medical 
manslaughter.   Also in a recent empirical study Quick demonstrated that charging 
patterns for medical manslaughter in the U.K. are geographically mal-distributed in 
favour of one geographical region.69  He postulates that this may be a sign of increased 
prosecutorial confidence in a region that has brought successful prosecutions, 
particularly given the generally low conviction rate for medical manslaughter vis-à-
vis manslaughter more generally.70   
It is unlikely that Canadian society has been immune amongst western 
countries in experiencing the types of cultural change associated with a generalised 
loss of trust and an increased desire for accountability and blame.  However, this 
generalised mistrust does not yet appear to be associated as strongly with health 
systems and health professionals as it does in other countries.  To some degree 
federalism can be held to be a contributing factor to explain these differences as 
Canada has not one but many health systems each with its own separate regulatory 
environment and regulatory and policing actors and thus events are localised in 
effect.  Although there have been several inquiries into allegations of unsafe practices 
in healthcare in Canada,71 these inquiries have not, at least to date, resulted in a 
public loss of faith in self-regulation by hospitals and professional bodies, nor a 
fundamental reappraisal of the regulatory environment.    Such inquiries in the 
Canadian context have also been few in number, compared to the level of public 
scrutiny afforded in England of an astonishingly frequent litany of negligent acts 
involving significant numbers of patients.  Lastly, the nature of the Canadian inquires 
have differed.  The Krever Inquiry looked at the management systems for blood72 and 
the Winnipeg Inquiry‟s scrutiny focused on hospital management and did not 
examine in any detail other actors in the health system.73  In not looking more broadly 
these investigations may have confirmed or at least may suggest to the public that 
these events were isolated and that the self-regulatory mechanisms in place remained 
effective to safeguard the public interest.    
Prosecutions of physicians for alleged negligence in their professional practice 
have been even less successful in Canada than in the United Kingdom.    The outcome 
of the most recent case, where four doctors were acquitted after facing charges of 
criminal negligence and public nuisance relating to the management of the Canadian 
blood system, may further discourage prosecutions for criminal negligence.   
What is apparent from an examination of the Canadian case-law is that in a 
number of cases judges have been somewhat scathing about the degree of negligent 
practice shown by the accused, but have concluded that in the specific circumstances 
of the case the mere fact of negligence with a dreadful outcome does not amount to 
criminal negligence.74  The Canadian courts, unlike it is suggested the courts in some 
other jurisdictions75, also do not appear to be conflating the seriousness of the 
                                              
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, Final Report, (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 1997) [The Krever Report];  Winnipeg Provincial Court, The Report of the 
Manitoba Paediatric Cardiac Surgery Inquest: An Inquiry Into Twelve Deaths at the Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre in 
1994, by Associate Chief Judge Murray Sinclair (Winnipeg: Provincial Court of Manitoba, 1998) online: 
Paediatric Cardiac Inquest <http://www.paediatriccardicinquest.mb.ca>. [Winnipeg] 
72 Krever, ibid. 
73 Winnipeg supra note 71. 
74 See especially, Abate, “Newmarket MD” supra note 46. 
75 Runciman, Merry, & Walton, Getting it Right, supra note 28. 
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consequences with the culpability of the actions.76  To quote Madam Justice Benotto: 
“The events here [the “tainted blood” disaster] were tragic.  However, to assign blame 
where none exists is to compound the tragedy.”77  The Canadian courts seem to 
reserve criminal negligence in the context of the provision of health services for only 
the gravest cases, in contrast with U.K. courts whose decisions to convict some 
physicians for negligent acts that were mistakes, slips or lapses with a significant 
systemic component have attracted critical comment.78   
Broader considerations of policy have also been considered by at least one 
Canadian court in respect of negligence in professional practice.  Although this article 
focuses on physicians, a relatively recent case involving a nurse against whom a 
criminal charge was laid in respect of admitted negligence in professional practice 
nicely illustrates this point.79 In that case a nurse was accused of criminal negligence 
after administering an incorrect drug to a patient.  The judge noted that the nurse had 
a reasonable belief that it was the right drug. The judge concluded that there was no 
moral blameworthiness on the part of the nurse nor was there a marked departure 
from accepted standards.  As to broader policy considerations, the judge particularly 
noted that the nurse had immediately voluntarily reported the error to the hospital 
and her colleagues which enabled the patient to be treated, albeit unsuccessfully.  
Also that prompt disclosure facilitated a review by the hospital of its policies and 
practices to minimise the likelihood that the same or similar mistake could occur in 
the future and thus improve the safety and quality of the services offered to the 
public.  Accordingly, the judge determined that a conviction in this case could deter 
self-reporting of negligent acts or omissions by health professionals, an outcome that 
the judge thought was not in the public interest.80         
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The criminal law is an important regulatory tool to employ against health 
professionals who grossly deviate from safe practice but not when a negligent act, 
however tragic its outcome, is one to which all humans, especially those working in 
complex systems are prone.  The limited numbers of cases and the very small 
conviction rate indicate that, at present anyway, those responsible for administering 
the criminal system in Canada see that the criminal law should have limited 
application in this area.  
 
 
                                              
76 Ibid.  
77 Armour supra note 2 at para.307. 
78 Merry & McCall Smith, Errors supra note 31; Ferner & McDowell, “Doctors” supra note 3; McCall 
Smith, “Merely Human” supra note 3. 
79 R. v Omstead [1999] O.J. 570. 
80 Ibid. 
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Figure 1: Number of physicians charged with criminal negligence causing death 
or grievous bodily harm in Canada as the result of alleged negligent professional 
practice 1900-2007 
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Figure 2: Physicians facing serious criminal charges as a result of alleged 
negligence in professional practice: Comparison of UK and Canadian charging 
rates 1900-2005 
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Table 1: Outcomes of charges against physicians 
Years Total Charged Total Convicted / Guilty plea 
1889-1980      6 3 (but all overturned on appeal) 
1980-2007      9 1 
Total      15 1 out of 15 (6.67 percent) 
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Table 2: Number of physicians charged with criminal offences by practice area 
Practice area Total charged 
Obstetrics 1 
Paediatrics 1 
Anaesthesia 1 
Addictions 2 
Surgery - 
Physician in hospital setting 3 
House surgeon/resident 2 
Health system management 4 
Unknown 1 
Total 15 
 
